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Regional integration is not a new phenomenon in Africa. It can be traced back to the 
creation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 1917, which was the 
world’s first customs union. Upon gaining independence, states formed the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU). At that time, Heads of States viewed regional 
integration as a protectionist measure against colonialism and as a way of forming a self-
sustaining continent. However, the additional challenges facing Africa over time 
prompted various initiatives by Heads of States which were aimed at deepening 
integration on the continent. Notable actions include the signing of the Abuja Treaty, 
which established the African Economic Community (AEC), and the replacement of 
the OAU by the African Union (AU). Further, the continent experienced an increase in 
the number of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and there are now fourteen 
RECs.  
Despite the steps taken to further integration, the success of such regional integration 
on the continent has been minimal and Africa has become even more marginalized on 
the global market. This lack in progression can be attributed to challenges such as 
inadequate resources, overlapping memberships in multiple RECs and duplicated 
programmes and efforts. Another challenge that is not readily recognized is the lack of 
attention to the role of law in economic integration. RECs have largely focused on the 
economic and political aspects of regional integration but have given minimal attention 
to the necessity of a strong legal foundation. RECs develop community law and these 
laws should be enforceable within Member States. However, due to the weak legal 
systems of RECs in Africa that do not make community law supreme, enforceability of 
this law has proven challenging. Comparatively, other RECs such as the European 
Union, have achieved deeper levels of integration and this can partly be attributed to the 
strong legal systems that have been developed. It is on the basis of this challenge that 
this study is conducted. The study aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the 
weaknesses of existing legal systems of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The 
study further analyses the manner in which other RECs, such as the European Union 
and the Economic Community of West African States, have successfully integrated 
through law, with the aim of identifying solutions for the existing weaknesses in 
Southern Africa. 
Key words: regional integration, regional economic communities, regional trade 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
States have long been engaged in the trade of goods, services and capital. Various 
reasons can be put forward for interstate trade such as the benefits gained from access 
to materials and services of other states, increased investment opportunities, creation of 
job opportunities and increased product variety and competition.  
Interstate trade must be regulated and this can be done through either the multilateral 
trading system or through regional integration initiatives. This Chapter looks to provide 
a brief background on both of these mechanisms of regulation. 
1.1.1 The History of the Multilateral Trading System and The Proliferation 
of Regional Trade Agreements 
The multilateral trading system is regulated by the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between states.1 
Although the multilateral trading system as it exists today appears to be functional and 
effective, the development of such a system was a complex task. The history of the 
WTO can be traced back to negotiations between the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America which lead to political and economic conferences being held between 
allied governments. Through these conferences, a number of international organizations 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were established. 
However, the most relevant conference in the current context was the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment, which was held in Havana, Cuba in 1947. This 
conference saw the adoption of the Havana Charter for an International Trade 
Organization, the purpose of which was to establish a multilateral trading organization.2  
Unfortunately, the entry into force of the Havana Charter took longer than was 
anticipated and states were in need of some form of regulation of the trading system. 
Thus, pending the entry into force of the Havana Charter, twenty-three contracting 
parties signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.3 The purpose of this was to 
provide an interim mechanism to protect and implement concessions that had been 
                                                          
1 What is the WTO?, available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm, 
accessed on 24 August 2016.  
2 Pre-WTO Legal Texts, available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm, 




negotiated at the conference in Havana.4 The contracting parties then adopted a 
Protocol of Provisional Application, and this led to the creation of an unofficial, de facto 
international organization known as the GATT.5 The contracting parties intended the 
GATT to be a provisional organisation operating until the Havana Charter took effect. 
However, the Havana Charter was not ratified by some states which meant the 
envisaged International Trade Organization could not be established. As a result, the 
multilateral trading system was regulated by the GATT for decades to come.6  
Over the years, GATT evolved through several rounds of negotiations, the most 
significant of which was the Uruguay Round.7 The Uruguay round, which took place 
between 1986 and 1994, transformed the nature of the multilateral trading system and 
resulted in the creation of the World Trade Organization, which replaced the GATT. 
The establishment of the WTO meant that there was now a permanent institution 
regulating the multilateral trading system rather than a provisional organization. Other 
changes brought about by the Uruguay Round included an increase in the matters 
covered by the WTO agreements,8 the single undertaking principle,9 and a stronger 
dispute settlement mechanism.10 
Since its establishment, the WTO has grown in membership with 164 states currently 
being members. However, despite the progress made in the multilateral trading system, 
the trading system has also seen an increase in the number of Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs). As of 1 September 2016, 424 notifications of RTAs had been 
made to the WTO, of which 267 were in force.11 RTAs are defined as groupings of 
states which are formed with the objective of reducing barriers to trade between the 
member states, but these groupings are not restricted to countries within the same 
geographic region.12  
                                                          
4 Ibid. 
5 World Trade Organization ‘Understanding the WTO’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf, accessed on 18 February 
2017. 
6 Craig VanGrasstek ‘The History and Future of the World Trade Organization’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/historywto_e.pdf, accessed on 20 February 2016. 
7 Understanding the WTO op cit note 5. 
8 GATT dealt mainly with trade in goods, but the WTO and its agreements now additionally cover trade 
in services and intellectual property. 
9 In terms of this principle, every item of a negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible package and 
cannot be agreed to separately.   
10 The Dispute Settlement Understanding entails a more structured process.    
11 See Regional Trade Agreements available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm, accessed on 18 February 2017.  
12 Parthapratim Pal ‘Regional Trade Agreements in a Multilateral Trade Regime: An Overview’ available at 
http://www.networkideas.org/feathm/may2004/survey_paper_RTA.pdf, accessed on 14 August 2016. 
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States conclude RTAs for various reasons. First, RTAs enable access to larger markets 
which may be easier to obtain by way of regional or bilateral agreements especially if 
there is an unwillingness among WTO members for further trade liberalization.13 
Second, RTAs are viewed as a way of deepening integration of economies in areas that 
are not available through the WTO.14 Third, discriminatory liberalization may be an 
attractive defensive measure to smaller economies which cannot compete 
internationally.15 In addition to these reasons, RTAs also have the benefit of increasing 
the bargaining power of the member states at the multilateral level.16 These reasons very 
easily relate to developing countries that experience challenges in negotiations with 
developed countries at the multilateral level. It therefore does not come as a surprise 
that Africa has also experienced an increase in the number of RTAs. 
1.1.2 Regional Trade Agreements in Africa 
For decades, African states have come together to address common challenges and 
achieve common objectives. Regional integration initiatives in Africa can be traced back 
to the creation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which is the world’s 
oldest customs union, in 1910 and the first East African Community (EAC) in 1917.17 
Regional integration was embraced even more by African states upon gaining 
independence which lead to the establishment of organizations such as the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU), which was later replaced by the African Union (AU), and the 
African Economic Community (AEC). 
The main reason behind economic integration between states in Africa is the benefits 
such integration has to offer. These benefits include increases in competition, increases 
in the variety of products available and a reduction in internal inefficiencies.18 
Considering that Africa is characterised by small countries, small economies and small 
markets, the use of regional integration to address developmental challenges makes 
                                                          
13 Jo-Ann Crawford and Roberto V. Fiorentino ‘The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements’ 
available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers8_e.pdf, accessed on 24 
August 2016. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Manone Regina Madyo The Importance of Regional Economic Integration in Africa (unpublished MCom thesis, 
University of South Africa, 2008) 49. 
17 Jonathan Bashi Rudahindwa ‘The Role of integration through law in African FTAs’, available at 
http://giftaproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Rudahindwa-2015-paper.pdf, accessed on 6 July 
2016. 
18 Henry Mutai, Compliance with International Trade Obligations the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (2007) Kluwer Law International. 
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sense19 and it is no surprise that the number of Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs)20 within the continent has increased. RECs have been recognized as key 
components towards the establishment of the African Economic Community and 
although there are now fourteen RECs in Africa, only eight are recognized as such 
building blocks (key components) of the AEC. The recognized eight are the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African 
Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).21  
The general approach to regional integration adopted by RECs within Africa is the 
linear market integration approach. This approach entails communities gradually 
progressing from a Free Trade Area (FTA) to complete economic integration.22 The 
linear mode of integration is the mode adopted by the European Union (EU) and it is 
advanced that African RECs have followed the same approach due to the success of the 
EU.  
However, despite the long-lasting efforts towards the integration of Africa’s major 
economic regions, success of these efforts has been minimal. Without discounting the 
progress achieved within Africa in areas such as trade, transport, energy and free 
movement of people,23 Africa has become even more marginalized on the global market 
instead of gaining strength as a competitor. This lack in progression has been attributed 
to challenges that have hindered the promotion of integration. Such challenges include 
inadequate funding of the communities, multiplicity of memberships in RECs, and poor 
implementation of community commitments by member states, to name a few.24 In 
addition to these challenges, regional integration initiatives in Africa have given little 
attention to the role of law in effective integration.  
                                                          
19 Trudi Hartzenberg ‘Regional Integration in Africa’ (2011) Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-14, 
Economic Research and Statistics Division, World Trade Organization 3. 
20 Regional Trade Agreements in Africa are generally referred to as Regional Economic Communities. 
21 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa ‘African Union (AU) and Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) in Africa’, available at http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/african-union-au-
regional-economic-communities-recs-africa, accessed on 2 May 2016.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: 




1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Existing regional integration initiatives in Africa have focused more on the economic 
and political aspects of integration and have placed minimal emphasis on the legal 
aspect of it. Not to say that the economic and political aspects are not important, but it 
is also important to recognize that law also has a role to play within these initiatives. In 
analysing the functioning of RECs it is important to understand that since RECs have 
law-making and enforcement powers, they constitute legal systems.  At the same time, 
the states that become members of RECs also have legal systems of their own and 
develop laws that are applicable within their jurisdictions. As a result, there are two of 
legal systems, namely the community legal system and the national legal systems of 
Member States, existing concurrently in a community.   
The lack of attention to the role of law in integration has resulted in a disjunction 
between community legal systems and the national legal systems of Member States.25 
The main issue that arises is the status of community law at the national level. RECs 
develop what is referred to as ‘community law’. Community law can be defined as the 
binding legal instruments of a regional economic community and it is binding on the 
Member States of that community.26 Community law may take the form of treaties, 
protocols, regulations, decisions, principles, objectives and general undertakings.27 
However, due to the disjunction, questions such as “is community law supreme?” and 
“can individuals rely on community laws at national level?”, arise.  
Ordinarily, the founding treaties of RECs should define the relationship between the 
community law and national law but that if that is not the case, reference must be made 
to national constitutions and jurisprudence to determine the relationship.28 Preliminary 
research on African RECs indicates that founding treaties do not define the relationship 
between community law and national law.  The same can be said for the two prominent 
regional integration initiatives in Southern Africa; namely the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA). Established in 1992 and 1994 respectively, neither of the founding 
                                                          
25 Richard Frimpong Oppong ‘Making Regional Economic Community Laws Enforceable in National 
Legal Systems – Constitutional and Judicial Challenges’ (2008) 8 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern 
Africa. 
26 Gerhard Erasmus ‘The domestic status of international agreements: has the South African 
Constitutional Court chartered a new approach and could regional integration benefit?’ (2012) 12 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Richard Frimpong Oppong, Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa (2011) 189. 
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treaties of these RECs make provision for the status of community law vis-à-vis national 
legal systems. This has resulted in the enforcement of community laws in Member 
States being a challenging task.  This challenge is illustrated by the Mike Campbell (PVT) 
Limited v Republic of Zimbabwe29 case which will be discussed in more detail in a later 
chapter.  
This lack of attention to the role of law in economic integration is arguably one of the 
major challenges faced by African RECs. An effective legal system would not only 
ensure compliance and uniformity, it would also provide protection to member states 
and private parties. Thus, there is a need for a defined relationship between community 
law and national laws, and for effective judicial organs. This study aims to evaluate the 
current situation in Southern Africa with specific focus on the SADC and the COMESA 
communities.  
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is statute based and as such focuses on the treaties and protocols 
of the SADC and COMESA. The review highlights the relevant provisions of the 
SADC and the COMESA treaties in relation to the role of law and identifies the existing 
gaps. 
Both the SADC and COMESA treaties require Member States to take steps towards 
realising community law. Article 6(5) of the SADC Treaty stipulates that Member States 
must take necessary steps to accord the Treaty the force of national law, and Article 5(2) 
of the COMESA Treaty provides that Member States must take necessary steps to 
ensure the enactment and continuation of legislation to give effect to the Treaty. 
However, neither of the treaties make provision for the supremacy of community law 
vis-a-vis national law. 
As with any other form of law, there are primary and secondary sources of community 
law. Treaties are the primary source of community law and secondary sources are 
developed by the organs of the community. In SADC, the Summit is the supreme policy 
making institution and it is also tasked with adopting legal instruments for the 
implementation of the SADC Treaty,30 thus it develops community law. The Summit is 
                                                          
29 SADC (T) Case No.2/2007. 
30 Article 10(3) of the SADC Treaty. 
7 
 
the only organ of SADC that has the authority to develop legal instruments but it may 
delegate this authority to the Council or any other institution of SADC.31 
In COMESA, community law is developed by the Authority and the Council of 
Ministers. The Authority is the supreme policy organ of COMESA and its directions 
and decisions are binding.32 The Council of Ministers is the organ responsible for 
making regulations, issuing directives and taking decisions, among other things.33 These 
are considered secondary sources of community law, each having different effects on 
the Member States. In terms of Article 10 of the COMESA Treaty, regulations of the 
Council are binding on all Member States;34 directives are binding on each Member State 
to which they are addressed but only with regard to the result to be achieved and not 
the means of achieving it;35 and decisions of the Council are binding upon the Member 
States on whom they are addressed.36 This is similar to what is provided for under 
Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
Regarding enforcement, within the SADC, the SADC Tribunal is the organ responsible 
for ensuring adherence to and the proper interpretation of the Treaty and subsidiary 
instruments.37 The decisions of the Tribunal are final and binding.38 In terms of Article 
44(1) of the new SADC Protocol on the Tribunal, Member States must take the 
necessary measures to ensure execution of decisions of the Tribunal. In the instance the 
Tribunal has made a judgment against a party and that party fails to comply, any 
Member State affected by the decision may refer such a failure to the Tribunal.39 The 
Tribunal, upon establishing such a failure, must then refer the matter to the Summit to 
take appropriate action.40 In COMESA, the COMESA Court of Justice (COMESA CoJ) 
is the organ that is entrusted with ensuring adherence to the law in the interpretation 
and application of the COMESA Treaty.41 The judgments of the COMESA CoJ are 
final and conclusive and may not be appealed.42 The COMESA Treaty, however, is 
                                                          
31 Ibid.  
32 Article 8(3) of the COMESA Treaty. 
33 Article 10(1) of the COMESA Treaty.  
34 Article 10(2) of the COMESA Treaty. 
35 Article 10(3) of the COMESA Treaty. 
36 Article 10(4) of the COMESA Treaty. 
37 Article 16(1) of the SADC Treaty. 
38 Article 16(5) of the SADC Treaty. 
39 Article 44(3) of the Protocol on the Tribunal in SADC, 2014. 
40 Article 44(4) of the Protocol on the Tribunal in SADC, 2014. 
41 Article 19 of the COMESA Treaty. 
42 Article 31 of the COMESA Treaty. 
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silent on the procedure to be followed in the instance a party fails to comply with the 
judgment of the court. 
The abovementioned provisions regarding enforcement can be compared to the manner 
in which failure to comply with judgments is dealt with in the EU. Under Article 260(2) 
of the TFEU, the European Commission may bring a case to the European Court of 
Justice (EU Court of Justice) if the Commission considers that a Member State has 
failed to comply with the judgment of the EU Court of Justice. It is then within the 
power of the court to impose a penalty on the Member State if it finds that the Member 
State has not complied with its judgment.43 
Other than the judicial organs of the communities, some provision is made for the 
involvement of administrative organs in the enforcement of community law. In Article 
17 of the COMESA Treaty, the COMESA Secretariat is given the authority to 
investigate a presumed breach of the provisions of the COMESA Treaty and report this 
to the Council of Ministers. This is similar to the role of the European Commission 
under Article 17(1) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which provides that 
the European Commission has a responsibility to oversee the application of Union law.  
It is important to mention that the SADC Treaty does not make provision for reference 
by national courts to the Tribunal as regards interpretation of SADC Treaty provisions. 
The COMESA Treaty, on the other hand, does make provision for this and stipulates 
that where a question is raised before a national court concerning the application or 
interpretation of the Treaty, the court shall request the COMESA CoJ to give a 
preliminary ruling on this question.44  
1.4 HYPOTHESIS, RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES 
The assumption investigated in this research is that the establishment of an effective and 
supreme community legal system will deepen integration and contribute to the success 
of economic integration. 
The main research question this study seeks to address is whether an effective 
community legal system contributes to the success of economic integration. To this end, 
the study has the following objectives: 
(a) Analyse the status of community law in SADC and COMESA;  
                                                          
43 Article 260(2) of the TFEU. 
44 Article 30(1) of the COMESA Treaty. 
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(b) Assess the role the courts have played in the enforcement of community laws 
of SADC and COMESA;  
(c) Assess the role that other organs of SADC and COMESA play in the 
enforcement of community law; 
(d) Determine what lessons can be learnt from the experiences of other 
communities such as the European Union, the East African Community and 
the Economic Community of West African States. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This research will be literature based. First, primary resources will be relied upon, which 
include treaties, protocols and declarations of SADC and COMESA. Second, reference 
will be made to secondary resources including books, journal articles, publications by 
international and non-governmental organizations, as well as newspaper articles. Last, 
internet resources will be used to obtain additional information such as reports, 
academic articles and newspaper articles. 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The following is the structure of the study: 
Chapter One 
Chapter One will provide an introduction to the paper. This chapter will provide a 
background into the multilateral trading system and the proliferation of regional trade 
agreements around the world. Further, the chapter will provide the background into the 
study, setting out the objectives of the paper and the methodology used. 
Chapter Two 
Chapter Two will provide an overview of the progress of regional integration in 
Southern Africa with specific focus on the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). In 
addition, this chapter will look at the earlier attempts to integration within Southern 
Africa and assesses the current institutional and legal framework of the SADC and 




Chapter Three aims to analyse the enforcement of community law at the national level 
within SADC and COMESA. To this end, the chapter will look into the concepts of 
monism and dualism, direct effect of community law, direct applicability of community 
law and the preliminary reference procedure. In addition, the chapter will look at the 
role of national courts and the individual in the enforcement of community laws, which 
will include an evaluation of cases that have been dealt with by the respective judicial 
organs of these communities. 
Chapter Four 
Chapter Four analyses other regional economic communities and aims to draw on their 
experiences, as a means of identifying any lessons that can be adopted by Southern 
African economic integration communities to improve the effectiveness of regional 
integration. Focus will largely be given to the European Union due to its long standing 
history as a successful REC with an effective legal framework. However, the chapter will 
also consider other economic communities such as the East African Community. 
Chapter Five 















2. CHAPTER TWO: AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Southern African states have pursued regional integration for some time now. This has 
lead to the development of a number of economic communities such as the Southern 
African Customs Union, the Southern African Development Coordination Community 
and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. The purposes and methods, 
however, of such integration initiatives have evolved in order to keep up with changing 
times. Earlier integration initiatives were aimed more at strengthening the independence 
of states and developing collective self-sufficiency.45 For instance, the Southern African 
Development Coordination Community (SADCC) was established with the aim of 
breaking the economic power South Africa held over its neighbours by focusing 
strongly on intraregional infrastructure and institutions.46 Taking into consideration the 
challenges facing states at the time, the initiative was well suited for the time. 
However, changes in society and developments in the world such as globalization, have 
required regional integration initiatives to adapt so as to deal with arising challenges. As 
such, some of the earlier initiatives have undergone transformative processes in an 
attempt to accommodate the needs of member states and have adopted different 
objectives and frameworks.  
Chapter Two will provide an overview of the development and progress of regional 
integration in Southern Africa with specific focus on the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA). This chapter looks at the earlier attempts to integration within 
Southern Africa and assesses the current institutional and legal framework of the SADC 
and COMESA communities.  
 
2.2 THE HISTORY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
                                                          
45 Rene N’Guettia Kouassi ‘The Itinerary of the African Integration Process: An Overview of the 
Historical Landmarks’ (2007) 1 African Integration Review at 2. 
46 Christian Peters-Berries ‘Regional Integration in Southern Africa – A Guidebook’ available at 
https://www.iaj.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/sadc_-
_guidebook_for_regional_integration11.pdf, accessed on 1 June 2016. 
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Regional integration in Southern Africa dates back to the early 1900s when the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) was established. Over time regional integration 
initiatives have evolved and increased in number, which has resulted in most states in 
the region being a member of at least one community. The various initiatives are now 
discussed. 
2.2.1 The Southern African Customs Union 
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is one of the regional integration 
initiatives that can be traced back to the colonial era. It was established in 1910, by four 
states namely; the South African Union (South Africa), Basutoland (Lesotho), 
Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland.  
Of the Member States, South Africa had the strongest economy and the other 
economies were highly dependent on it.47 This dependence was largely influenced by the 
revenue distribution system established under the 1969 SACU Agreement.48 The 
revenue distribution system allocated portions of the community’s revenue to each 
Member State. The majority of the Union’s revenue was contributed by South Africa 
and went to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and in most instances, this distributed 
revenue constituted a significant portion of the government revenue of these states. In 
exchange for the revenue received, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland essentially 
protected South Africa and were politically compliant with the Apartheid regime.49  
As the strongest economy in the Union, South Africa played a managerial role and 
managed the technical aspects of the Union. In terms of Article 5 of the 1969 SACU 
Agreement, South Africa alone had the authority to determine the external tariff policy 
of the Union. The effect of this provision was that South Africa managed the tariff 
levels in the interest of its own economy. South Africa was essentially in control of the 
Union.  
The power dynamics of the Union, however, shifted when the Agreement was 
renegotiated in 1994. Although it took several years, the Member States signed the new 
SACU Agreement in 2002. One of the changes the 2002 SACU Agreement introduced 
was that the external trade policy is to be determined jointly by the Council of 
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Ministers,50 which consists of Ministers of Finance and Trade from all Member States. 
This provision has made the Union more democratic since all Member States, or their 
representatives, can partake in the decision making process. 
SACU remains one of the more successful communities in Africa and has evolved since 
its establishment. However, as with all other regional economic communities, SACU 
faces challenges as well. One major challenge being the revenue distribution system, 
which was retained in the 1994 renegotiations. As South Africa continues to be the 
strongest economy in the Union, it continues to provide the largest share of the revenue 
and the other Member States continue to be dependent on the revenue they receive. 51 
However, the system is proving unsustainable for South Africa due to factors such as 
the global economic crisis and will have to be addressed.  
2.2.2 The Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was formed in 
1980.52 The SADCC was aimed at breaking the economic power that South Africa held 
over its neighbours by focusing strongly on intraregional infrastructure and institutions.  
Unlike most regional integration initiatives in Southern Africa, the SADCC did not 
adopt the neo-classical economic theories of integration that focus on benefits from 
trade.53 Rather, the Member States of SADCC chose a project coordinated approach. In 
terms of this approach, economic activities and development projects to be pursued by 
the community were specified and each Member State was allocated a specific sector for 
coordination.54 As such, the SADCC did not pursue regional integration but rather 
regional cooperation, emphasising the role of individual states in areas of coordination.55  
The SADCC did not have a legally binding instrument but rather adopted a 
decentralised structure. The purpose of this was to protect the sovereignty of its 
Member States. This approach proved challenging because Member States were 
unwilling to place the interests of the community above their own.56 Despite the 
decentralized structure, the SADCC did have institutions that were established by a 
                                                          
50 Article 11 of the 2002 SACU Agreement. 
51 Stewart Payne op cit note 47. 
52 The states that formed the SADCC were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
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53 Kyu Deug Hwang ‘The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa’ (2007) 
10 International Area Review at 64. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid at 66. 
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Memorandum of Understanding. These institutions included the Summit, the Council 
of Ministers, the Sectoral Commissions, the Standing Committee and the Secretariat.  
In the late 1980s, the SADCC leaders reassessed the approach of the SADCC to 
integration and increasingly placed greater importance on the role of the market in the 
development process.57As the Apartheid regime came to an end, the SADCC leaders 
realized the original objective of the SADCC would no longer be suitable to their 
needs.58 The leaders further realized the importance of trade liberalization. As such, a 
decision was made to shift from the regional cooperation approach initially adopted to a 
trade based regional integration model.59 This lead to the transformation of the SADCC 
the Southern African Development Community.60  
2.2.3 The Southern African Development Community 
Considering the changes in the global market and factors such as increasingly 
competitive regional markets, the leaders of the SADCC realised the need to transform 
the informal association of states into a legally binding regional economic community. 
This transformation took the form of the Southern African Development Community61 
(SADC), which was established in 1992. 
The transformation to the SADC not only resulted in the adoption of legally binding 
instruments but also in the adoption of a centralized structure so as to meet the 
integration agenda of the community. This had the effect of binding Member States to 
observe the SADC objectives and principles62 and prevented them from freely placing 
national interests above those of the community.  
The change in the institutional structure saw the establishment of new institutions and 
the restructuring of pre-existing institutions of the SADCC. A brief overview of these 
institutions is now discussed. 
  
 
                                                          
57 Arigo Pallotti ‘SADC: A development community without a development policy?’ (2004) Review of 
African Political Economy at 516. 
58 Christian Peters-Berries op cit note 46. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Currently SADC has fifteen members. These are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, 
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62 Article 6 of the SADC Treaty. 
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(a) The Summit 
The supreme policy making organ of the SADC is the Summit. It comprises Heads of 
State or Government of SADC Member States.63 The Summit is responsible for the 
overall policy direction of SADC64 and for adopting legal instruments for the 
implementation of provisions of the SADC Treaty.65 The Summit may, however, 
delegate the authority to adopt legal instruments to any other institution of the 
community that the it may deem fit.66 Decisions of the Summit are taken by consensus 
and are binding.67  
(b) The Council of Ministers 
The Council of Ministers (SADC Council) consists of one minister from each Member 
State.68 The Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of this institution are appointed by 
the Member State holding the Chairpersonship and Deputy Chairpersonship of 
SADC.69  
The functions of the SADC Council include overseeing the functioning and 
development of SADC;70 overseeing the implementation of SADC policies;71 and 
directing, coordinating and supervising the operations of the institutions of SADC that 
are subordinate to it.72 In addition, the SADC Council, plays an advisory role to the 
Summit on matters of policy.73 As such, the SADC Council serves as the engine room 
of SADC in that it develops and implements the common agenda of SADC.74  
(c) The Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees 
The Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees consist of ministers from each 
Member State.75 The purpose of the Committees is to ensure proper policy guidance, 
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64 Article 10(2) of the SADC Treaty. 
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coordination and harmonisation of cross-sectoral activities76. As such, the Committees 
oversee the activities of the core areas of integration including trade, industry, finance 
and investment;77 infrastructure and services;78 and food and agriculture.79 Furthermore, 
the Committees also have decision making powers as a means of ensuring rapid 
implementation of programmes approved by the SADC Council.80 
(d) The Secretariat 
The Secretariat is the principal executive institution of SADC.81 Headed by the 
Executive Secretary,82 this organ is responsible for planning and managing SADC 
programmes;83 monitoring and evaluating the implementation of such programmes;84 
harmonizing the policies of Member States;85 and general administration;86 among 
others. 
(e) The Tribunal 
The SADC Tribunal is the institution entrusted with ensuring adherence to and proper 
interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty.87 The Tribunal consists of at least 
ten Judges, five of which are regular Judges who shall sit regularly on the Tribunal and 
the additional five shall constitute a pool from which the Judge President may select a 
judge to sit on the Tribunal in the absence of a regular judge.88  
In terms of the Protocol on the Tribunal adopted in 2000, the Tribunal had jurisdiction 
over the implementation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes 
between Member States.89 The decisions of the Tribunal were to be final and binding,90 
and Member States and SADC institutions were required to take all measures necessary 
to ensure execution of decisions of the Tribunal.91 However, following the suspension 
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of the SADC Tribunal in 2010, a new Protocol on the Tribunal was adopted. The 
suspension of the Tribunal and the effect of this decision will be discussed in greater 
detail in a subsequent chapter. 
(f) The SADC Parliamentary Forum 
The parliamentary organ of SADC is the SADC Parliamentary Forum ( SADC Forum) 
which was established in 1997. The Forum is an inter-parliamentary organ which was 
established as a mechanism to allow parliamentarians an opportunity to participate in 
the regions development and integration agenda.92 Through the Forum, the citizens of 
SADC Member States are able to know the aims and objectives of SADC, whilst the 
Forum informs the SADC of the views of the people on development issues.93 As such, 
the Forum promotes good governance and democracy.94  
Despite the vision for the Forum to progress into a fully-fledged Regional Parliament, 
this is yet to happen. At the moment, the Forum is restricted to an advisory role and it 
does not exercise any legislative or oversight functions. This means the Forum is not in 
a position to oversee the executive organs, let alone to hold them accountable. 
2.2.4 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established in 
1994 and was preceded by the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(PTA). The PTA was established in 1981 with the aim of creating a larger market for 
greater social and economic cooperation between the Members States.95 However, the 
PTA Treaty envisaged the transformation of the PTA into a common market and in 
conformity with this, the Treaty establishing COMESA was signed in 1993 and ratified 
in 1994. Thus COMESA was established.  
COMESA has 1996 members and has adopted a trade development approach to 
integration, in terms of which the community is to progress in three stages. The first 
stage was the establishment of a Free Trade Area in which all tariff and non-tariff 
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barriers between COMESA Member States were to be eliminated.97 The FTA, which 
was launched in 2000 by 9 Member States, now has 16 Member States. The second 
stage was the formation of a customs union with the implementation of a Common 
External Tariff as stipulated in Article 47 of the COMESA Treaty. The COMESA 
Customs Union was launched in 2009. The third and final stage, which is yet to be 
implemented, is the formation of a Monetary Union. Article 4(4)(a) of the COMESA 
Treaty stipulates that Member States shall co-operate in monetary and financial matters 
and gradually establish convertibility of their currencies and a payments union as a basis 
for the eventual establishment of a monetary union. To this end, one of the strategies 
being pursued by the community is the monetary and financial programme which is 
aimed at creating a zone of monetary stability with an efficient exchange and payments 
system in order to facilitate the market integration of the region. The long-term goal is 
to attain a Monetary Union with a single currency.98 
COMESA has established eight institutions, which include executive and judicial organs. 
Below is an overview of some of the institutions that are relevant in the context of this 
paper. 
(a) The Authority 
The Authority is the supreme organ of COMESA and consists of Heads of State or 
Governments of the Member States.99 Responsible for the executive functions of 
COMESA,100 this organ has the power to give directions and make decisions which are 
binding on Member States and other organs of the Common Market except the 
COMESA Court of Justice.101 
(b) The Council of Ministers  
The Council of Ministers (COMESA Council) consists of Ministers designated by each 
Member State.102 The COMESA Council has various functions such as making 
recommendations to the Authority on policy matters, approving budgets of the 
Secretariat and the Court of Justice, and making recommendations to the Authority on 
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the designation of Least Developed Countries.103 However, the most important function 
of the COMESA Council, with respect to this research project, is it’s authority to issue 
rulings that have the status of law within the community despite the Council not being a 
legislature.  
The COMESA Council is empowered to make regulations, issue directives, take 
decisions, make recommendations and give opinions. Regulations of the COMESA 
Council are binding on all Member States in their entirety;104 directives are binding on all 
Member States to which they are addressed but only regarding the results to be 
achieved, not the way they are to be achieved; 105 and decisions are binding on those to 
whom they are addressed.106 Recommendations and opinions of the COMESA Council, 
however, are not binding in nature.107  
(c) The Technical Committees 
COMESA has established various technical committees for each area of cooperation. 
The role of these committees is to develop and monitor the implementation of 
programmes in their respective areas of cooperation.108  
(d) The Secretariat 
Headed by the Secretary General, the Secretariat is essentially the administrative organ 
of COMESA. The Secretary General is responsible for assisting the other organs in the 
performance of their functions; and for the administration and finances of the Common 
Market.109 The Secretariat further has the task of ensuring that the objectives set out in 
the COMESA Treaty are attained and investigating any presumed breach of the 
Treaty.110  
(e) The Court of Justice 
COMESA established a Court of Justice (COMESA CoJ) which is tasked with ensuring 
adherence to the law in the interpretation and application of the COMESA Treaty.111 It 
is composed of seven impartial and independent judges from Member States112 and has 
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jurisdiction over all matters which may be referred to it, pursuant to the Treaty.113 
Matters may be referred to the COMESA CoJ by Member States, the Secretary General 
and legal and natural persons.114  
Decisions of the COMESA CoJ are final and conclusive and are not open to appeal.115 
In addition to this, decisions on issues relating to the interpretation of the Treaty take 
precedence over decisions of the national courts.116  
 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
The existence of integration initiatives in Southern Africa for such a long time indicates 
the desire of Southern African states to work together to achieve common objectives. 
This is further reflected by the adaptation of these initiatives to meet the demands of the 
changing society. Regional economic communities in Southern Africa have made 
progress in areas such as trade, transport and freedom of movement of people. 
Regarding the legal and institutional framework of the communities, the establishment 
of judicial organs was imperative for the enforcement of community law. Therefore, the 
SADC Tribunal and the COMESA Court of Justice are essential organs within the 
communities. 
On the downside, the communities in Southern Africa have neglected to establish 
legislative organs for purposes of developing community law and representing the 
people of the Member States. Instead, legislative functions are vested in other organs of 
the communities such as the SADC Summit. This has resulted in the slow development 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: THE ENFORCEMENT OF COMMUNITY LAW IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Regional economic communities have two types of legal systems operating within them. 
On the one hand, there is the community legal system which makes and enforces laws 
that are applicable to Member States of the community. On the other hand, are the 
national legal systems which make and enforce laws applicable to persons within each 
respective Member States. The relationship between the community legal system and 
the national legal system is said to be of a vertical nature.117 
Community law is viewed as an external source of law and is not readily received in 
national legal systems. Often conflicts arise regarding whether community law can be 
applied within Member States directly and whether residents of Member States can rely 
on the rights created by community law at the national level. The core of these conflicts 
is essentially the status of community law within national legal systems. 
Chapter Three aims to analyse the enforcement of community law at the national level 
within SADC and COMESA. To this end, the chapter will look into the concepts of 
monism and dualism, direct effect and direct applicability of community law and the 
preliminary reference procedure, to explain the manner in which community law can be 
applied within Member States. In addition, the chapter will look at the role of national 
courts and the individual in the enforcement of community laws, which will include an 
evaluation of cases that have been dealt with by the respective judicial organs of these 
communities. 
3.2 THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY LAW 
The term ‘community law’ has not been explicitly defined as yet, however, various 
attempts have been made at defining it. Erasmus defines community law as the binding 
legal instruments of specific RECs.118 He advances that community law is a form of 
international law but it is viewed as a sui generis legal regime.119 This is because ordinarily, 
states are the parties to international agreements and as such only states have rights and 
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can litigate in terms of these agreements.120 However, regional economic community 
agreements have the ability to confer rights not only on states but also on individuals 
within Member States and these rights can be can be enforced either at the national level 
or regional level.121 
Within the European Union, community law is given both narrow and broad 
definitions. Narrowly, community law is said to consist of the founding treaties and the 
provisions of the instruments enacted by the community institutions.122 In a broader 
sense, community law is said to include all the rules of the community legal order, that 
is, general principles of law, case law and supplementary law contained in conventions 
and agreements concluded between Member States in order to give effect to treaty 
provisions.123  
From these definitions it can be deduced that community law is a form of international 
law that creates rights and obligations within the community, that are applicable to bith 
Member States and individuals. Community law can have various sources. The primary 
source is the founding treaty/treaties of the community. Whilst secondary sources 
include the laws made by the community institutions through the powers that have been 
conferred on them. As Oppong advances, community laws can also take the form of 
regulations, decisions, principles, objectives and general undertakings.124  
As the primary source of community law is a treaty, it is unquestionable that community 
law is a form of international law. Consequently, the question of the enforcement of 
community law falls under the wider scope of the relationship between international law 
and national law. It is with this in mind that this chapter briefly considers the various 
mechanisms that have been used to further understand the relationship between 
international law and national law. 
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3.3 OVERVIEW OF KEY CONCEPTS  
Conflicts in the relationship between international law and national law have been in 
ongoing for decades. The main reason for the conflict is the unwillingness of states to 
relinquish their sovereignty. However, there are many mechanisms that have been 
developed in order to enable the reception of international law into national law. Some 
of these are now discussed.  
3.3.1 The Concept of Supremacy of Community Law 
The supremacy of community law is a key aspect of the vertical relationship that exists 
between the community legal system and legal systems of Member States. This is 
because supremacy to a large extent affects the reception and enforcement of 
community law in Member States. 
The supremacy of community law is based on the premise that a community is an 
independent entity that has its own legal system with its own legal sources. By becoming 
members of a community, states bind themselves to observe the rights and obligations 
created by the community, and this has the effect of limiting national sovereignty.125 It 
follows that in order for community law to be effective, a rule developed by the 
community legal system must not be capable of being overruled by a rule of national 
law.126 Should this be the case, the attainment of the objectives set out in the community 
treaty would be at risk.127 Thus, the supremacy of community law ensures community 
law will be the applicable law in instances of conflict with national laws. In addition, 
supremacy ensures the uniform application of community law in Member States.128 
A notable aspect of supremacy of community law is that the community legal system 
becomes an integral part of the legal system of Member States and national courts are 
under an obligation to apply it.129 The concept of supremacy therefore has the effect of 
community law being treated differently to other forms of international law. If 
supremacy is provided for, the mechanisms of reception of international law that have 
been developed become unnecessary.  
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Ideally, provision for the supremacy of community law should be made in the founding 
treaties but it can also be made by other means. An example of this being the 
development of the doctrine of supremacy of community law by the European Court of 
Justice,130 whilst the European Union treaties are silent on the matter. As it stands, 
neither the SADC nor the COMESA communities contain provisions regarding the 
supremacy of community law. 
3.3.2 Monism and Dualism 
The applicability of international law within states and the extent to which it can be 
applied is dependent on the nature of the legal system of each state. Scholars have, over 
the years, understood the applicability of international law in states by classifying states 
as either monist or dualist.  
The monist theory is based on the idea that both international law and national law 
derive their validity from the same source.131 Law is understood as a unity and 
international law rules are considered part of national law.132 This means that a treaty 
becomes a part of national law once it has been concluded in accordance with the 
constitution of the relevant state and has entered into force for that state,133 without 
requiring the enactment of national law to give it effect. This process, also referred to as 
the doctrine of automatic incorporation, may be provided for either in the states’ 
constitution, statutory law or it may be an unwritten principle of law.134  
A key aspect of monism is that, although international law is incorporated into national 
law, it continues to be international law as part of the internal legal system135 and does 
not become part of the national law. In cases of conflict, international law prevails over 
national law.136 Of the states in Southern Africa, Mozambique is one of the few states 
that has a monist legal system and ratified regional treaties automatically become part of 
national law.137  
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The dualist theory, on the other hand, is based on the idea that international law and 
national law are two distinct legal orders, each with its own characteristics.138 As such, 
any rights and obligations created by a treaty have no force or effect within a state 
unless they are given effect by way of national legislation. Dualist states require 
international law to be recast or transformed into national law in order to have an effect 
in a national legal system.139 The effect transformation has is that the relevant 
international law is no longer considered as part of international law but becomes a part 
of national law. Within Southern Africa, there are several states that have dualist legal 
systems, these include Malawi140 and Zimbabwe141. 
Having briefly considered these two theories, it is important to note that not all states 
can be characterized as being strictly monist or strictly dualist. As submitted by Tshosa, 
monist and dualist theories may, in practice, not purely determine the relationship 
between national and international law.142 Tshosa argues this on the basis that the 
applicability of treaties within a state is determined by the constitution of that state and 
that the practical approach of national courts regarding the application of a treaty may 
not effectively reflect what the constitution provides.143 This can be illustrated by 
referring to the South African case of Glenister v President of the Republic of South 
Africa144(Glenister case). In the Glenister case, the Constitutional Court had to determine 
whether section 7(2) of the Constitution of South Africa (SA Constitution) and ratified 
treatise that have not been domesticated impose a positive obligation on the state to 
establish an independent anti-corruption unit.145 In terms section 231(2) of the SA 
Constitution, an international agreement is binding on the Republic only after it has 
been approved by the resolution of the National Assembly and the National Council of 
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Assemblies. The SA Constitution, further, provides that an international agreement 
becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation.  
The minority judgment in this case argued that section 231(2) does not imply that an 
international agreement that is ratified by Parliament becomes law in the Republic upon 
such ratification.146 Rather, the agreement is only binding at an international level and 
will only become a part of domestic law if it is incorporated into domestic law in terms 
of section 231(4) of the SA Constitution.147 The majority judgment, however, took a 
different approach. Whilst confirming that section 231(2) of the SA Constitution has the 
effect that international agreements approved by Parliament become binding between 
the Republic and other states parties to such agreement at an international level, the 
majority judgment also advances that such an agreement has domestic effect.148 The 
majority argued that the SA Constitution, which requires the state to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights,149 imposes a positive obligation on the 
state to take steps to give effect to the SA Constitution.150 In this instance, the positive 
step to be taken was the establishment of an anti-corruption body, as required by a 
treaty that had not been incorporated into domestic law.  
This case illustrates the issue regarding characterizing states as dualist or monist. The 
constitution of a state may make provision for the reception of international law into 
national legal systems but the courts may adopt an approach that diverts from this. 
Although these theories have been used to understand how international law may be 
applied within states, the theories rather provide a basic understanding of the 
relationship between international law and national law. In order to determine the 
method of reception of international law in states, it would therefore be necessary to 
analyse the constitutions as well as the case law of each state.  
3.3.3 The Principles of Direct Applicability and Direct Effect 
The principles of direct applicability and direct effect were developed to address the 
challenges faced in enforcing community law within Member States. The principle of 
direct applicability has its origins in the European Union. In terms of this principle, 
community law becomes a part of national law without intervening national 
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implementation measures.151 This means that community law automatically becomes 
part of national law without the need of a national measure such as an Act of Parliament 
to give it effect. Community law is essentially binding and applicable in Member States 
immediately upon coming into operation.152  
Through direct application, community law bypasses the ordinary modes through which 
international law is incorporated into national law. As such, community law maintains its 
nature and is not transformed into national law. Since community law does not have to 
be translated into national law, direct applicability also results in community law not 
being subjected to the national laws on the hierarchy of laws.153 Oppong advances that 
applying the national laws on hierarchy of laws would have the effect of upsetting the 
vertical relations between community and national legal systems.154 This is an important 
feature in the context of regional integration because the community and its laws should 
be the supreme authority in order for regional integration to be effective and for there 
to be uniformity among Member States. 
The principle of direct effect, in comparison to direct applicability, determines whether 
community law creates enforceable rights within national legal systems. It is through this 
measure that individuals are enabled to invoke community law before national courts.155 
As the importance of protecting the rights of individuals in the international sphere has 
increased over the years, this principle plays a crucial role in protecting rights created at 
the community level. However, neither the SADC nor the COMESA treaties make 
provision for the direct effect of community law.  
Direct applicability and direct effect can be provided for in community treaties. The 
Treaty on European Union, for instance, makes provision for direct applicability as it 
states that a regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all 
Member States.156 However, the exclusion of these rules in a community treaty does not 
mean that they cannot be provided for in a different manner. Direct effect in the 
European Union, for example, was developed by the European Court of Justice 
jurisprudence and is now an integral part of European Union Law. Upon examination, it 
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has been found that the SADC and COMESA treaties fail to make provision for the 
direct applicability or direct effect of community law. 
 
3.4 ENFORCEMENT OF COMMUNITY LAW IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
When states become parties to a REC, a relationship is created between the Community 
and the Member State. Through the founding treaties, Member States enjoy certain 
rights but they also have certain obligations that they must observe. Member States are 
required to nationally implement regional objectives in order for regional integration to 
be effective and for the realization of the benefits regional integration has to offer. As 
such, it is necessary for mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that Member States 
comply with their obligations. This section considers the current mechanisms in place 
for enforcement of community law in Southern Africa RECs.  
3.4.1 The Role of Judicial Organs 
Community treaties make provision for the enforcement of community law through 
various organs of the community. The community, more specifically its organs, must 
ensure compliance with the obligations created by the community. However, states are 
reluctant to surrender their sovereignty and this results in enforcement challenges.  
Judicial organs are the primary enforcers of community law in most RECs and they are 
responsible for monitoring adherence. In the communities under consideration, 
however, the judicial organs appear to be the only organs with enforcement powers. 
Enforcement by the judicial organs of both the SADC and COMESA is now 
considered. 
(a) The SADC Tribunal 
Within the SADC Community, the judicial function is entrusted to the SADC Tribunal 
(the Tribunal). The Tribunal is tasked with ensuring that the provisions of the treaty and 
subsidiary instruments are adhered to, as well as adjudicating any disputes referred to 
it.157 In addition, the Tribunal is responsible for the interpretation of the Treaty.158 Any 
decisions made by the Tribunal are intended to be final and binding.159  
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Although established in 1992, through the SADC Treaty, the inauguration of the 
Tribunal and swearing in of members only took place in 2005. The Tribunal adopted the 
Protocol on the Tribunal (“2000 Protocol”) pursuant to Article 16(2), which makes 
provision for substantive and procedural matters of the Tribunal.  
Unfortunately, the Tribunal was suspended by a decision of the Summit following the 
Tribunal’s decision in the case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. And Others v Republic of 
Zimbabwe.160 The discussion on the Tribunal will therefore focus on two aspects; namely 
the case of Campbell161  
case and the suspension of the Tribunal.  
(i) The Campbell case 
The case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. And Others v Republic of Zimbabwe162 is a landmark 
case not only for the SADC Tribunal but for economic integration in general. In 2007, 
Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and William Michael Campbell (the Applicants) filed an 
application with the Tribunal challenging the acquisition of land by the Republic of 
Zimbabwe (the Respondent).163 At the time of the application, Zimbabwe was engaged 
in the acquisition of land and had enacted Section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
(Amendment No. 17, 2005) (“Amendment 17”). Amendment 17 made provision for the 
acquisition of agricultural land by the government for purposes such as land 
reorganization and relocation. The acquired land was to be vested in the state and no 
compensation was to be paid except for any improvements effected on the land prior to 
acquisition.164 In addition, Amendment 17 prohibited persons with any right or interest 
in the land from applying to any court to challenge the acquisition. 
Prior to making the application to the Tribunal, the parties instituted an action in the 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe to challenge the acquisition of their land. However, before 
the Supreme Court handed down its judgment, the parties approached the Tribunal. 
The Applicants simultaneously filed an application for an interim measure restraining 
the Respondent from removing the applicants from the land pending a decision by the 
Tribunal.165 The Tribunal granted the interim measure sought.  
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In their application, the Applicants argued that the Respondent had breached its 
obligations under the SADC Treaty. Firstly, the Applicants argued that Amendment 17 
was in breach of Article 4(c) of the Treaty, which requires states to act in accordance 
with human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The rule of law embraces two rights 
namely the right to access the courts and the right to a fair hearing.166 Access of 
individuals to the courts is viewed as a fundamental right that states parties to treaties, 
especially human rights treaties, are obliged to uphold and protect. Case law holds that 
in a constitutional democracy founded on the rule of law, disputes between the state and 
its subjects should be adjudicated upon in court. In considering the facts before it, the 
Tribunal found that Amendment 17, which prohibits parties whose land has been 
acquired in terms of section 16B (2)(a)167 from challenging the acquisition, deprives the 
parties of their right to protection of the law and to have a fair hearing. Thus, the 
Tribunal held that the Respondent was in breach of Article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty. 
Secondly, the Applicants argued that there was a breach of Article 6(2) of the Treaty 
which prohibits discrimination against persons by Member States. In their argument, the 
Applicants stated that the expropriation of land by the Zimbabwean Government was 
primarily based on considerations of race and ethnic origin, regardless of whether the 
farmers acquired the land during the colonial period or after independence.168 The 
Tribunal, in considering all the facts, found that although Amendment 17 did not 
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explicitly mention race or ethnicity, implementation of Amendment 17 only affected 
white farmers.169 The Tribunal held that this constituted indirect discrimination170 and as 
such, the Respondent was in violation of its obligations under Article 6(2) of the SADC 
Treaty.  
In its final decision, the Tribunal ordered the Respondent to protect the possession, 
occupation and ownership of the land of the Applicants. The final and binding nature of 
decisions made by the Tribunal means a party cannot appeal decisions of the Tribunal. 
In addition, the binding nature of Tribunal decisions means that the party against whom 
the judgment has been made is under an obligation to comply with it. 
Furthermore, Article 32 of the 2000 Protocol made provision for the enforcement and 
execution of decisions of the Tribunal. Although the Protocol did not provide for the 
manner in which such decisions are to be enforced, it stipulated that the enforcement of 
the decisions is to be governed by the law and rules of civil procedure of the relevant 
state.171 In this case, that would have been the law and rules of civil procedure in 
Zimbabwe. This provision was problematic because, firstly, the laws of states make 
provision for the enforcement of judgments made by foreign national courts, but not 
for judgments made by international courts.172 Secondly, Member States are obliged to 
take all the steps necessary to ensure the execution of the Tribunal’s decisions,173 the 
manner of enforcement is at their discretion. Thus it is unlikely to have decisions of 
regional courts enforced if the civil procedure rules do not provide for such 
enforcement. 
Should a Member State fail to enforce a decision of the Tribunal, the 2000 Protocol 
provided that such non-compliance may be referred to the Tribunal.174 Due to the 
Respondent’s failure to uphold the Tribunal’s decision, the applicants pursuant to 
Article 32(4), referred the non-compliance to the Tribunal. Upon investigation, the 
Tribunal found that the Respondent had in fact failed to comply with the order. 
Unfortunately, the Tribunal does not have the capacity to enforce its decisions. Rather, 
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the mandate of the Tribunal is to adjudicate the disputes referred to it and once this is 
done, the Tribunal is considered to have fulfilled its function.175  
As such, upon a finding of non-compliance, the Tribunal must refer the failure to the 
Summit for appropriate action to be taken. This was done according to Article 32(5) of 
the 2000 Protocol. However, the 2000 Protocol failed to define what is meant by 
“appropriate action”. Additionally, although the SADC Treaty makes provision for the 
imposition of sanctions against a Member State that fails to fulfil its obligations,176 it  
fails to stipulate the form these sanctions may take. The lack of provision results in the 
matter being at the discretion of the Summit which decides what appropriate action is, 
which may be no action at all. 
The problem with the power of enforcement of Tribunal decisions being entrusted to 
the Summit rather than the Tribunal is that enforcement may be influenced by politics. 
The Summit is consisted of the Heads of State or Governments of the Members States 
of the SADC, and as such there are political interests at play. This is exemplified by the 
Campbell case. Rather than the Member States taking a stand on the protection of human 
rights, the Summit remained silent on the matter and went to the extent of suspending 
the operations of the Tribunal. The suspension of the Tribunal and the effect of this will 
be discussed further. 
(ii) The Suspension of the SADC Tribunal and Its Implications 
The decision of the SADC Tribunal in the Campbell case was a step in the right direction 
as it indicated the independence of the organ from political influences. The Tribunal’s 
decision, however, threatened the sovereignty of Member States as well as the control 
that the Heads of State or Government have over it. Following the decision in the 
Campbell case, the Summit was the organ responsible for imposing sanctions on the 
defaulting state. However, instead of the Summit imposing any sanctions, it called for 
the review of the Tribunal by the region’s Judges and Attorneys General.177  The 
Tribunal was in effect suspended since it was not permitted to hear any cases, whether 
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pending or new cases; and the terms of the serving Judges were not renewed and new 
Judges were not appointed. 178 
Although the Summit stated that the suspension would only be for a period of six 
months pending the conclusion of the review, the suspension has continued despite 
receiving the report on the conclusions and recommendations of the review. The 
suspension is to be maintained until the Tribunal’s protocol has been reviewed and a 
new protocol takes effect.179 However, it is important to note that the Tribunal still 
exists and will continue to exist until the entry into force of a new Tribunal protocol. 
To this end, the Summit adopted and signed the new Protocol on the Tribunal in 2014 
(2014 Protocol). In drafting and adopting the 2014 Protocol, the SADC leadership 
sought to establish a tightly controlled dispute settlement system with limited 
jurisdiction.180 The will of the SADC leadership is reflected in the changes that were 
introduced in the 2014 Protocol in comparison to the 2000 Protocol. One significant 
change is that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been restricted compared to the 
jurisdiction it had under the 2000 Protocol. The 2014 Protocol stipulates that the 
Tribunal shall have jurisdiction on the interpretation of the SADC Treaty and 
Protocols.181 This provision brings about two changes. First, this provision restricts locus 
standii to Member States only, and excludes natural and legal persons from being able to 
bring matters before the Tribunal as they previously could under the 2000 Protocol. 
Second, the provision excludes the Tribunal’s authority to hear disputes on the 
application or interpretation of legal instruments.182 This means the Tribunal may only 
make decisions regarding the interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols. 
Furthermore, on the issue of jurisdiction, the 2014 Protocol gives Member States the 
option to opt out of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.183 Article 33(1) of the 2014 
Protocol stipulates that a state party may withdraw from the Protocol twelve months 
after the state has given notice to this effect.  
An aspect of the 2000 Protocol that has been retained is that in the instance of non-
compliance with a Tribunal ruling, the matter is to be referred to the Summit which has 
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the authority to take appropriate action. This essentially puts community law 
enforcement within SADC in the same position it was after the Campbell ruling. 
Entrusting this power with the Summit is even more problematic because the decisions 
by the Summit are taken by consensus.184 The effect of this is that any Member State can 
block a decision form being made, including the state against which sanctions might be 
imposed.185  
(b) The COMESA Court of Justice 
Within the COMESA, the Court of Justice (the COMESA Court) was established as the 
judicial organ of the community. Established pursuant to Article 19 of the COMESA 
Treaty, the Court is responsible for ensuring the law is adhered to with respect to the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty, and it has jurisdiction over all matters 
referred to it pursuant to the COMESA Treaty. 
Regarding the issue of enforcement of community law, the COMESA Court has heard a 
few cases that have involved enforcement in Member States. One such case is the Polytol 
Paints & Adhesives Manufacturers Co. Ltd v The Republic of Mauritius186 case. In this case, the 
Applicant, Polytol Paints and Adhesives Manufacturers Co. Ltd, was a company 
incorporated in Mauritius. The Applicant sought a declaration, by the Court, to the 
effect that the Republic of Mauritius, the Respondent, had infringed the COMESA 
Treaty. The application was based on the fact that the Respondent had introduced a 
customs duty against specific products that were imported from Egypt, contrary to the 
Article 46 of the COMESA Treaty. Article 46(1) of the COMESA Treaty requires 
Member States to reduce and ultimately eliminate customs duties and other charges of 
equivalent effect imposed on the importation of goods which are eligible for Common 
Market tariff treatment. Although the Respondent initially complied with the provision, 
it later introduced the customs duty in dispute due to an import surge of Egyptian 
products. 
Prior to approaching the Court, the Applicant challenged the measures adopted by the 
Respondent at a national level. The Applicant instituted an action before the Supreme 
Court of Mauritius. The Supreme Court, however, found that it could take cognizance 
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of provisions of the COMESA Treaty only to the extent that they have been 
incorporated into the municipal law. The Supreme Court stated that non-fulfilment by 
Mauritius was not enforceable in national courts in the absence of such incorporation.187  
The Applicant then sought relief from the COMESA Court. However, because the 
application was made after the Respondent had removed the customs duties, the 
Applicants sought to recover a refund for the duties it had paid which it claimed to have 
been unfairly and unlawfully levied, rather than for the customs to be removed. The 
Respondent filed an application to set aside the Applicants reference on the basis the 
applicant did not have locus standii.  
In the Polytol case, the Court had to consider the question of whether or not individuals 
who reside in Member States can have an enforceable right under the COMESA Treaty. 
In other words, whether provisions of the COMESA Treaty are directly enforceable. 
The Respondents argued that provisions of the COMESA Treaty do not give 
individuals enforceable rights and are only enforceable by Member States. However, the 
COMESA Court held otherwise. The Court referred to Article 26 of the COMESA 
Treaty which provides that “any person who is resident in a Member State may refer for 
determination by the Court the legality of any act, regulation, directive, or decision of 
the Council or of a Member State on the grounds that such act, directive, decision or 
regulation is unlawful or an infringement of the provisions of this Treaty”. The Court 
viewed community law as not only creating obligations applicable against residents of 
Member States but also creating rights that can be enforced by the residents.188 As such, 
the Court held that residents have a right before the Court if they establish that they 
have been prejudiced by an act of a Member State that contravenes the COMESA 
Treaty. 189 
The decision in the Polytol case impacts both regional integration generally and the role 
of private parties in regional integration specifically. This decision reflects the 
importance of private parties in effective regional integration and reaffirms the position 
that regional integration not only creates rights for Member States but also for such 
private parties. Restricting access to regional courts to Member States would result in 
regional integration being driven by political motives. This is illustrated by the fact that 
in instances of trade disputes, rather than litigating against one another, Member States 
                                                          
187 Ibid at 5. 




opt to deal with such disputes by way of political discussions and meetings.190 This case 
sets a precedent that can be referred to in future cases to further strengthen the position 
of community law in national legal systems. 
Another landmark case in the COMESA Court is the Malawi Mobile Ltd v Government of 
Malawi and MACRA. In this case, the Applicant was Malawi Mobile Ltd (MML), and the 
Respondents were the Government of the Republic of Malawi and Malawi 
Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA). The case was brought on the basis of 
a Licence Agreement between MML and MACRA, in terms of which MML was to 
provide its network service within 12 months of the licence being granted. MML failed 
to meet the deadline and requested an extension from MACRA, which was granted.191 
The issue in dispute arose when MACRA, allegedly induced by the Malawian 
government, revoked the licence before the lapse of the 12-month extension period. 
MML sued the Government of Malawi and MACRA for breach of the agreement in the 
High Court of Malawi which ruled in its favour.192 The Respondents appealed the ruling 
in the Supreme Court of Malawi, which overturned the ruling of the High Court.193 The 
Applicant then brought the matter before the COMESA Court. 
The Applicant sought to have the ruling of the Supreme Court of Appeal set aside. The 
Government of Malawi argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction because the 
alleged breach was not an unlawful act under the COMESA Treaty but was an issue that 
was dealt with under national laws of Malawi.194 The Government of Malawi was of the 
opinion that the Court only had jurisdiction over matters relating to the Treaty and 
community law and not national laws of Member States.195 In its decision on the matter, 
the Court held that on the basis of Article 26 of the COMESA Treaty, which provides 
access to the Court by natural and legal persons resident in Member States, MML had 
rightly brought the matter to the Court.196  
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Regarding the contention by the Government of Malawi that the court did not have 
jurisdiction over matters relating to national laws of Member States, the court stated that 
adopting such a restrictive interpretation of the Court’s jurisdiction would preclude the 
Court from determining the extent to which a Member State is complying with the 
COMESA Treaty.197 As such the court held that it did have the necessary jurisdiction to 
hear the matter.  
This decision is important for the development of community law in COMESA. Firstly, 
it further strengthens the role and rights of private parties in the community. Secondly, 
it broadens the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction in that the Court is not restricted to 
only hearing matters concerning the Treaty or community law, but it can consider 
national laws in order to make its decisions. In addition to the authority of the 
COMESA Court to impose sanctions for non-compliance,198 such rulings place the 
COMESA Court in a position if increasing strength.  
3.4.2 The Role of National Courts 
National courts play an essential role in the effectiveness of regional integration. It is 
through the courts that community law can be given effect without having to be 
incorporated through legislation. The courts act as guardians of economic integration 
and enforcers of the benefits that economic integration brings to individuals.199  
One way national courts may enforce community law is by making use of the 
preliminary reference procedure. The preliminary reference procedure enables national 
courts to refer to regional courts for interpretive guidance. Through this procedure, a 
national court which has to decide a case involving the interpretation of a treaty 
provision may seek guidance from the relevant regional court before it makes its final 
decision.  
This procedure bridges the gap between community and national legal systems and 
avoids instances of national courts giving treaty provisions their own interpretations. In 
addition, it is a mechanism through which regional courts can give their opinion on the 
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application of community law and the status of community law within the legal systems 
of Member States.200  
There are a number of community treaties that make provision for the preliminary 
reference procedure such as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union201 
and East African Community Treaty202. With respect to SADC and COMESA, it is only 
the COMESA Treaty that makes provision for this procedure. Article 30 of the 
COMESA Treaty stipulates that where a question is raised before a court of a Member 
State concerning the application or interpretation of the COMESA Treaty, such a court 
may, if it considers that a ruling on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment, request the COMESA Court to give a preliminary ruling on the matter.203 
Thus referring to the COMESA Court is at the discretion of the court. However, 
referring a question to the COMESA Court is compulsory if the court is one against 
whose judgment there is no judicial remedy under the national law of the Member 
State.204 Unfortunately, the SADC Treaty does not contain a similar provision.  
3.4.3 The Role of Individuals 
Historically, access to regional courts by individuals has been restricted. However, in 
more recent times, economic treaties that have been adopted have granted individuals 
access to the courts. Considering the important role private parties play in effective 
economic integration, this is a welcome development.  
Provisions that grant individuals access to the courts can be found in the COMESA 
Treaty.205 The access of individuals to the COMESA Court is considered wide because 
parties merely have to prove that they have a general interest in the granting of 
protection of the community legal order. Parties are not required to prove an interest or 
a violation of their right in order to justify the claim. Access is, however, considered 
limited by the requirement that the party must be a resident in a Member State.206 
Additionally, parties are required to exhaust all local remedies first.207 
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Within the SADC community, individual access to the Tribunal was provided for in the 
2000 Protocol. Article 18 of the 2000 Protocol empowered natural and legal persons to 
refer disputes with the Community to the Tribunal. However, the new Tribunal 
Protocol has done away with this provision and has restricted access to the Tribunal to 
Member States only.208 The importance of granting individuals access to regional courts 
cannot be understated in the context of economic integration. Through having access, 
individuals can bring cases to the community courts that may otherwise not have been 
brought if left in the hands of the Member State. Individual access shifts power from 
the Member States and strengthens private enforcement of community law.  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In order for a community to achieve its objectives, Member States must comply with 
the rules developed by the community, that is community law. However, the leaders of 
Member States must be willing to comply with these laws and surrender their 
sovereignty to a certain degree. This, unfortunately, is not always the case. As such, 
strong mechanisms for the enforcement of community law are important for effective 
integration. 
Unfortunately, enforcement of community law in Southern Africa is weak. The 
community judicial organs have been given restricted powers of monitoring 
enforcement and do not appear to have authority to enforce decisions when Member 
States do not comply with community law.  
Regional Economic Communities in Southern Africa need to recognize the importance 
of community law and its effective enforcement in Member States. This recognition 
must then be translated into mechanisms for implementation and enforcement within 
Member States. Community courts need to be given more authority to enforce 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: EXPERIENCES OF OTHER REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognised that regional integration in Southern Africa is not as effective as 
it should be considering how long regional integration initiatives have existed in the 
region. Of the many challenges that hinder progress in this region, including multiple 
memberships in RECs, the poor implementation of community objectives is recognized 
as a major challenge. Within the challenge of poor implementation is the poor 
application of community law to further community objectives. 
The poor application of community law, however, is not unique to economic 
communities in Southern Africa. The matter of application of community law in 
sovereign states runs deep in the history of integration worldwide. The main 
complication has always been the unwillingness of states to relinquish their sovereignty 
to the extent necessary. States want to control which international laws apply in their 
borders and which ones do not. Applying community law in Member States has, 
therefore, been a longstanding challenge for economic communities. The silver lining, 
however, is that over time, some communities have developed in a way that has enabled 
the application of such law within states. 
This chapter, therefore, analyses other regional economic communities and aims to 
draw on their experiences, as a means of identifying any lessons that can be adopted by 
Southern African economic integration communities to improve the effectiveness of 
regional integration. Focus will largely be given to the European Union due to its long 
standing history as a successful REC with an effective legal framework. However, the 
chapter will also consider other economic communities such as the East African 
Community. 
4.2 THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES 
As previously stated, regional economic communities are created by way of a treaty, 
which is a contract between the states parties. The contract provides for the legal 
framework of the community and can take one of two forms; it may either be a 
complete contract or an incomplete contract.  
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With regard to complete contracts, the agreement concluded between Member States 
explicitly sets out the rights and obligations of each party.209 Furthermore, to the extent 
possible, such a contract makes provision for contingencies that might arise in future, 
and provides for a strong dispute settlement mechanism.210 In contrast, an incomplete 
contract, is much more flexible in that it does not make provision for all the aspects of 
the relationship between the states but merely acts as a starting point, providing for the 
basic aspects of the relationship.211 Thus such a contract does not have defined terms 
and conditions at the outset.  
The success of RECs is largely affected by the nature of their legal and institutional 
frameworks and whether these frameworks complement one another. It is argued that a 
prerequisite for successful economic integration is the existence of strong, independent 
and strong community organs, as this ensures Member States comply with their 
obligations.212 The reason for this is that in order for a treaty to be observed, there must 
be institutions that monitor such observation and implementation.  
Research has shown that a complete legal contract which has a strong dispute settlement 
mechanism works best with an intergovernmental institutional framework.213 With an 
intergovernmental setup, the community institutions act as a forum for cooperation 
between Member States but the Member States are not bound by the decisions of the 
institutions.214 On the other hand, a regional economic community established by an 
incomplete contract requires a strong and supranational institutional framework. In 
terms of supranationalism, Member States delegate authority to institutions which are 
superior and independent.215 These institutions are empowered to make decisions and 
                                                          
209 Hendrik Spruyt ‘Patterns of Regional Integration in Europe and North America: Insights from 
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laws which have a binding effect on Member States, as well as natural and legal persons 
within the community.216  
The function of the organ responsible for dispute settlement is not only limited to 
resolving disputes regarding an alleged breach of treaty obligations but also involves 
resolving disputes concerning interpretation of the treaty.217 An incomplete contract 
cannot be served by a weak dispute settlement organ. Incomplete contracts ordinarily 
include terms that are so ambiguous that different meanings may be attached to them. 
The dispute settlement organ therefore provides an interpretation that applies in all 
Member States. 218 Should an REC have both an incomplete contract and a weak dispute 
settlement organ, then an intergovernmental structure will not ensure compliance with 
regional objectives. Rather Member States will pick and choose which obligations they 
wish to comply with as well as when. This is the situation that exists currently within 
SADC.  
This has the effect of slowing down the progress of integration and further hinders in 
the uniform application of community law. The SADC Treaty is considered an 
incomplete contract which would have been better paired with a supranationalist 
approach. However, as can be seen from the previous chapters, the SADC institutions 
lack authority and power to enforce the SADC Treaty, thus the institutional framework 
is intergovernmental. The same can be said about the COMESA legal and institutional 
framework. 
4.3 LESSONS FROM OTHER REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITIES 
Over the years, numerous regional economic communities have been established, each 
with a unique legal and institutional framework that is designed to meet its needs. As has 
been observed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 
there is no common set of institutions that all African communities can adopt. Rather 
African regional economic communities can learn from the successes of other regional 
economic communities and avoid their mistakes. UNECA recommends that African 
regional economic communities adopt a flexible approach to institutional design that 
will accommodate their socio-political and economic environments.  
                                                          





It is with this in mind that the paper now turns to look at other economic integration 
initiatives and analyses their frameworks. This is done with the aim of gaining 
experiences that can be implemented in Southern African regional economic 
communities in order to improve their effectiveness. 
4.3.1 The European Union 
The European Union (EU) as we know it today is the result of gradual integration 
efforts by European states since the 1950s. The foundation of the EU can be found in 
the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1952. Other economic 
integration efforts by European states include the European Economic Community and 
the European Atomic Energy Community. The signing of the Treaty of Maastricht was 
a further step towards the integration of European states and this gave birth to the 
European Union.219 Since its establishment, the EU has grown significantly and now 
boasts a membership of 28 states. The EU has seen great success as an economic 
community and has gradually evolved to deal with the changing dynamics of the world. 
As a result of its success, the EU has become the model of regional integration. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that RECs in Africa have used the EU as the community from 
which to gain experience.  
A number of RECs in Africa have adopted a market integration approach due to the 
influence of the EU. However, it is advance that, due to the different economic 
backgrounds and prevailing circumstances in Africa and Europe, the EU framework 
may not necessarily be the best model for Africa.220 Africa has been subjected to slavery 
and colonialism,221 and is plagued by small, underdeveloped economies, but the same 
cannot be said for Europe. As such, RECs in Africa need to be modelled in a way that 
reflects the background and needs of the region if the full benefits of integration are to 
be yielded.  
On the other hand, however, it is argued that, some elements can be imported from the 
EU model in order for RECs to become more effective and achieve their results.222 The 
balance between these two arguments is to look at the EU as an example with caution. 
Due to its reputation as the most successful regional integration initiative, the EU must 
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be referred to for other communities to learn from. However, the framework of each 
REC must be designed to meet the needs of the region it serves. Thus the EU model 
cannot be copied and pasted to African regional economic communities but it can 
provide a basic framework which can be adapted.  
(a) The European Council and the EU Council223 
As the European Council is composed of Heads of State or Government of Member 
States, it can be compared to the executive institutions of SADC and COMESA; namely 
the Summit and the Authority respectively. The European Council is the organ 
responsible for driving the general policy direction of the EU.224 This institution 
establishes general policy guidelines by taking decisions and issuing instructions and 
guidelines to the EU Council and the European Commission.225 The authority of the 
European Council, however, is limited to this function as is the COMESA Authority. 
The same, however, cannot be said of the SADC Summit, which has legislative powers 
in addition to its executive powers. As a matter of fact, the TEU explicitly stipulates that 
the European Council does not have legislative functions.226 
Within the EU, the legislative function is allocated to two different institutions; namely 
the EU Council and the EU Parliament. Although the EU Council is also responsible 
for the coordination of economic policies of the Member States and drafting the 
preliminary budget, its primary function is the legislative function.227 This is contrary to 
the framework within the SADC and COMESA. In SADC, the legislative powers are 
exercised by the Summit whilst in the COMESA the function to create secondary 
community law is assigned to the Council of Ministers. Thus these communities do not 
have organs that have been established specifically to perform legislative functions. This 
in itself reflects the lack of understanding of the importance of law in the effective 
functioning of economic communities.  
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(b) The European Parliament 
The other legislative institution in the EU is the European Parliament. The role of the 
Parliament at the regional level can be better understood by understanding its role 
within states. At the national level, Parliament essentially has three functions; namely 
legislation, representation and oversight. The classic role of Parliament is that of 
legislation, as it is responsible for making new laws and amending old ones.228 In 
addition to this, the Parliament is the institution that represents the people and their 
interests.229 Furthermore, Parliament is, in theory, responsible for overseeing the actions 
of the executive and holding the executive accountable.230  
At the regional level, Parliament fulfils the same functions. A regional parliament is 
responsible for enacting community law; it is the organ that is constituted of 
representatives of the citizens of Member States and as such fulfils the representative 
function; and it oversees the exercise of power by the executive organs to ensure there is 
no abuse of power. As it stands, neither SADC nor COMESA have fully-fledged 
regional parliaments. 
(c) The European Commission 
The European Commission (EU Commission) plays a similar role as the Secretariats of 
the SADC and COMESA. Established pursuant to Article 13 of the Treaty on the 
European Union, the EU Commission is tasked with ensuring the application of the EU 
Treaties as well as overseeing the application of community law.231 The EU Commission 
has the role of ensuring compliance with community law and it exercises this function in 
two stages; namely the pre-litigation and post-litigation stages. 
Pre-litigation compliance occurs before a matter is taken to the European Court of 
Justice, and post-litigation compliance takes place after the European Court of Justice 
has made its decision regarding a matter.232 In terms of Article 258 of the TFEU, should 
the EU Commission consider that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations 
under the Treaties, the EU Commission must deliver an opinion on the matter. Before 
                                                          
228 Economic Commission for Africa ‘The Role of Parliament in Promoting Good Governance’ available 
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the EU Commission delivers its opinion, the Member State is given the opportunity to 
submit its observations on the claim of the EU Commission.233 In its opinion, the EU 
Commission gives the Member State a time period within which to comply with the 
opinion, failing which the EU Commission may bring the matter to the European Court 
of Justice. Through this provision, the EU Commission has the authority to monitor the 
observation by Member States of their treaty obligations. The EU Commission may 
initiate steps for compliance of its own initiative and does not have to wait for a 
Member State to allege non-compliance by another state. It is worth noting that the 
COMESA Secretariat has similar authority. 
The functions of the Commission regarding pre-litigation and post-litigation apply even 
when a Member State initiates a complaint of non-compliance against another. Article 
259 of the TFEU requires a Member State that considers that another Member State has 
failed to fulfil an obligation, to bring the matter before the EU Commission before 
bringing an action to the European Court of Justice.  
If a matter has been brought before the European Court of Justice and a decision made, 
the EU Commission has powers to submit the matter to the Court if it is of the view 
that the Member State has failed to take the necessary steps to comply with the Court’s 
judgment.234  
(d)     The European Court of Justice 
The European Court of Justice (EU Court of Justice) is the judicial organ of the EU. 
Similar to the SADC Tribunal and the COMESA Court of Justice, the EU Court of 
Justice has the task of ensuring that the law is observed in the interpretation and 
application of the EU Treaties.235   
In instances that a Member State considers another Member State to have committed a 
breach, the matter may be brought before the EU Court of Justice after the pre-
litigation procedures with the EU Commission are concluded.236 The EU Court of 
Justice must then consider the matter and if it finds that the Member State has indeed 
failed to comply with its obligations in the Treaty, the EU Court of Justice will require 
the state to take measures to comply with its judgment.237 If it is found that the state has 
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failed to comply with the court’s ruling, the court is empowered to impose a penalty on 
that state.238 This is contrary to the position of the SADC Tribunal, which must refer 
non-compliance to the Summit for the imposition of sanctions, if any. 
The EU Court of Justice has played a vital role in the success of the EU and in the 
strengthening of the legal framework of the EU. The EU Treaties do not make 
provision for the nature of the relationship between the community legal system and the 
national legal systems of Member States. Whether community law is applicable in 
Member States and whether it prevails over national law in cases of conflict is 
regrettably not set out in the EU Treaties. As such, this remained an area of uncertainty 
until the EU Court of Justice stepped in and filled the gap.  
Through its decisions in a number of landmark cases, the questions of the status of 
community law have been settled. The first step in the evolution of community law was 
the recognition by the EU Court of Justice that the EU was a new and independent legal 
order which creates rights and obligations not only for the Member States but for the 
citizens of such states as well.239 The EU Court of Justice then went on to develop the 
principle of direct effect by holding that provisions of EU law can be invoked and relied 
on by individuals before national courts.240 This was the first step in the development of 
the principle of direct effect through the use of case law. The second step was the 
development of the principle of supremacy of community law by the EU Court of 
Justice. In various cases before it, the EU Court of Justice held that where there is a 
conflict between community law and national laws, community laws should prevail and 
national courts are obliged to apply it even if it is contrary to the constitution of such a 
state.241 This had the effect of confirming the position that community law is supreme 
even over national constitutions of Member States. 
The EU Court of Justice has gradually evolved into a supranational institution and is 
now recognised as one of the most successful international courts. It is evident from the 
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aforementioned that the EU Court of Justice has authority over Member States. 
Member States in the EU cannot enact or apply laws that are contrary to community 
law and have had to implement legislative changes to comply with the decisions of the 
EU Court of Justice.  
The same, unfortunately, cannot be said about the judicial organs of the SADC and the 
COMESA. The judicial organs of these communities are rather intergovernmental than 
supranantional. Member States of these communities are unwilling to relinquish some of 
their sovereignty and as such, they do not uphold judgments of the courts. In addition, 
these organs have been given limited power to enforce non-compliance by Member 
States.  
4.3.2 The East African Community 
The current East African Community (EAC) was established in the year 2000 following 
the entry into force of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 
(EAC Treaty). This is the second EAC, as the first collapsed in 1977 due to a variety of 
challenges.242 The revival of the community saw the establishment of a number of 
community institutions and introduced principles from which Southern African 
integration initiatives can gain lessons. 
A notable feature of the EAC is that the EAC Treaty makes provision for the 
supremacy of community law. Article 8(4) of the EAC Treaty stipulates that community 
organs, institutions and laws will take precedence over similar national ones on matters 
pertaining to the implementation of the EAC Treaty. This provision is a step in the right 
direction as it signifies the recognition of the importance of superiority of community 
law in integration but also reflects the desire of Member States to achieve a deeper level 
of integration through community law. Through this provision, community law takes 
precedence in instances of conflict with national laws. Furthermore, Article 8(5) obliges 
Member States to take steps to adopt the necessary legal instruments to make 
community law supreme.  
(a) The East African Legislative Assembly 
The EAC has established a legislative organ; that is the East African Legislative 
Assembly (EALA). This institution performs legislative, representative and oversight 
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functions. Regarding the legislative function, the EALA is authorised to enact 
community law by way of passing Bills.243 Any member of the Assembly is permitted to 
introduce a Bill to the EALA but the consideration of such Bills is subject to certain 
limitations such as the requirement that the Bill to be considered must not make 
provision for the imposition of any charge upon the Community.244 Bills passed by the 
EALA have to be assented to by the Heads of State before they can become community 
laws.245 Once Bills have been presented to the Assembly, they can only be withdrawn 
through the introduction of a motion to the Assembly.246 Once a Bill has been passed by 
the Assembly, it is submitted to the Heads of State for assent247 which can either assent 
or not assent to the Bill.248 In the instance the Heads of State do assent, the Assembly 
must publish the Act in the Gazette.249  
Despite the constraint caused by the requirement that Bills must pass through the 
Heads of State before being enacted, the establishment of this organ remains notable. 
Considering the existing Parliamentary bodies in African RECs which do not have 
legislative powers, the establishment of the EALA is a progressive move by the EAC. It 
reflects the recognition of the need to have a legislative organ and the necessity of 
separation of powers at the regional level. Furthermore, the extensive provisions for the 
enactment of community law are a welcome development and this is a feature that is not 
provided for in the SADC and COMESA treaties. Comparatively, the SADC has 
established the SADC Parliamentary Forum. However, this body is not yet a regional 
parliament but a forum which provides advice.  
(b) The East Africa Community Court of Justice 
The East Africa Community Court of Justice (EAC Court) is the judicial organ of the 
EAC. The EAC Court has the task of ensuring adherence to law in the application and 
interpretation of, and compliance with the EAC Treaty.250 Its structure features a 
division of the court into the First Instance Division and the Appellate Division.251 The 
First Instance Division has the authority to hear and determine any matter before the 
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court in accordance with the EAC Treaty. A matter may then be appealed to the 
Appellate Division.252 The option of appeal is not provided for in the SADC and 
COMESA treaties, rather the decisions of the judicial organs in those communities are 
final and binding.  
 
4.3.3 The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa 
The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) is an 
organization that was established with the aim of uniting business laws of states parties. 
To date, the Port Louis Treaty on Harmonisation of Business laws in Africa has been 
ratified by 17 Western and Central African states. OHADA has been largely successful 
in the harmonization of business laws in Member States which in turn has promoted 
economic development within that region. OHADA boasts features that may serve as 
lessons for the SADC and COMESA. 
One such feature of OHADA which has contributed to its growth and success is that 
the provisions relating to the Uniform Agreements of the community are self-executing 
and have precedence over business laws enacted within Member States.253  Uniform 
Acts are the instruments used to adopt common rules of the community.254 This means 
that, once a state ratifies the OHADA Treaty, that state is automatically bound by the 
provisions of the Treaty and the Uniform Agreements.255 Through this aspect of 
OHADA’s legal framework, provisions of the Uniform Agreements do not have to be 
translated into national laws and states cannot avoid them. In other words, OHADA 
community law is directly applicable within Member States. 
The institutional framework of OHADA is also a feature to be considered. In the 
adoption of the Uniform Acts, two institutions play a role. The Uniform Acts are, in the 
first place, drafted by the office of the Permanent Secretary in consultation with the 
governments of Member States.256 The Uniform Acts must then be submitted to the 
Council of Ministers which is then responsible for adopting them in consultation with 
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the OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration.257 Through this two tier 
process, there is a degree of assurance that in passing the Uniform Acts there is 
transparency and involvement of interested parties. However, it must be noted that 
neither of these organs are legislative organs. 
 
4.3.4 The Economic Community of West African States 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is one of the RECs 
within Africa that has explicitly established executive, legislative and judicial organs. The 
principle executive organ is the ECOWAS Commission, previously named the 
ECOWAS Secretariat. The legislative organ is the Community Parliament and the 
judicial organ is the Community Court of Justice. The Community Parliament is 
designated the organ that represents the people.  
The role of the Community Parliament is to function as a forum for dialogue, 
consultation and consensus for representatives of the peoples of the Community to 
effectively promote integration.258 The establishment of the Community Parliament is 
therefore the furtherance of the involvement of the people of the community in the 




The legal and institutional frameworks of a regional economic community are an 
integral part of the community. The effective functioning of these communities is 
largely affected by the extent to which these two frameworks complement each other. 
Much can be gained through analysing other economic communities and the manner in 
which they have dealt with the challenges of enforcement. 
The consideration of other economic communities has brought a few things to light. 
First, the other communities have developed ways for community law to be applicable 
within the borders of Member States, which indicates the importance of enforcing 
community laws. Second, there is a need for the clear separation of powers in the sense 
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that the same organ must not perform executive, legislative and judicial functions, as 
this may lead to an abuse of power. Third, the other communities have highlighted the 
importance of a community parliament that is empowered to fulfil all three core 


























5. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The leaders of African states recognize regional integration as a necessity for the 
development and unity of the continent. At the continental level, the African Union and 
the African Economic Community both recognize the importance of RECs in 
economic integration and seek to strengthen them so as to achieve the objective of 
establishing a continental economic community. The Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community established a programme for the consolidation of the African 
regional economic communities, which has been incorporated into the African Union. 
Africa now boasts fourteen regional economic communities, although only eight are 
recognized as building blocs of the AEC. Within Southern Africa specifically, two of the 
most prominent communities are the Southern African Development Community and 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. These communities were both 
established in the 1990s and are part of the post-colonialism wave of regional economic 
communities in Africa. The SADC and COMESA have each made progress towards the 
achievement of their objectives and have established organs to support the achievement 
of their objectives.  
However, a common challenge encountered by both of these communities, and many 
others, is the implementation of community objectives within Member States. More 
specifically, these communities face challenges in enforcing community law within 
Member States. Community law consists of the rules that are developed by the 
community and are applicable to community members. Community law serves the 
purpose of providing Member States with a set of rules to abide by so as to further the 
achievement of community objectives. The challenge faced in enforcement of this form 
of international law relates to the fact that Member States are independent, sovereign 
states with their own legal systems. Member States are as such reluctant to apply 
community law within their borders as they view this to be a violation of their 
sovereignty. This results in Member States choosing to apply national law over 
community law.  
This challenge is not unique to Southern African regional economic communities. All 
regional economic communities have had to develop mechanisms through which 
community law may be enforced within Member States. Some communities have made 
community law supreme over national law and the Member States are obliged to apply 
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it, whilst other communities have adopted the principles of direct effect and direct 
applicability.  
It is important to realize that the effective application and enforcement of community 
law depends on a combination of factors. A community needs an organ that will 
develop the laws, an organ that will monitor the observance of the laws by Member 
States, and an organ that can enforce decisions in instances of non-compliance. In 
addition to this, a community needs clear rules on the status of community law vis-à-vis 
national law and on the sanctions to be imposed against a defaulting state. It is also 
crucial to the effective enforcement of community law that politics do not play a role. 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite the challenges faced, there is great opportunity for growth and development 
within the SADC and COMESA communities. Through analysing the existing gaps in 
the communities and considering the experiences of other communities, the following 
recommendations are made: 
5.2.1. Separation of Powers 
As with nations, a community requires separation of powers between its various organs. 
The functions of organs can be divided into three categories; namely the executive 
function, the legislative function and the judicial function. In order to ensure 
transparency and accountability and to avoid the abuse of powers, there is a need to 
distinguish between the organs that are responsible for each function. Therefore, an 
organ such as the SADC Summit should not be responsible for developing community 
law and enforcing it as well. It is recommended that this framework be revised. 
5.2.2 Independent Supranational Organs 
It has been established that both the SADC and COMESA treaties are incomplete 
contracts. Incomplete contracts are most effective with community organs that are 
independent and have the authority to make binding decisions. This is especially true 
with respect to the dispute settlement organ. It is through the dispute settlement organ 
that community law can effectively be enforced but this effectiveness is negatively 
affected if the organ is not independent and politics influence enforcement.  
Whilst the COMESA Court of Justice can be said to have the authority to enforce its 
judgments by imposing sanctions, the same cannot be said for the SADC Tribunal. The 
SADC Tribunal does not have the authority to enforce its judgments in instances of 
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default by a party, the power is instead vested in the Summit. The Summit is 
unquestionably subjected to political influence which means enforcement of judgments 
is also controlled by politics. It is therefore recommended that the power of 
enforcement be vested in the Tribunal. 
5.2.3 Establishing Regional Legislative Organs  
A regional parliament serves three functions; namely legislative, representative and 
oversight functions. Through the establishment of a functional regional parliament, it is 
advanced that the citizens of Member States will be able to contribute towards the 
development of community law and objectives. As the communities face challenges in 
the ratification of agreements and the implementation of its policies, the ordinary people 
of the communities do not see much of the benefits offered by integration nor do they 
participate in the process.  
This is a challenge that can be alleviated by the establishment of a regional parliament. 
Through a regional parliament, an economic community would become more 
democratic as the people would have a mechanism through which to participate in the 
community activities. As has been recognized, the people are an essential part of an 
economic community and they have both rights and obligations. It is difficult to 
envisage people of the community benefiting fully from what economic integration has 
to offer if they are unable to contribute to the decisions made and the executive organs 
are essentially empowered to do as they wish.  
Although it is recognised that developing into a regional parliament which can exercise 
legislative, representative and oversight powers is a process that takes time, it is 
recommended that the SADC and COMESA establish fully fledged regional 
parliaments.  
5.2.4 Supremacy of Community Law 
One of the most effective means of ensuring that Member States respect and observe 
community law is by making provision for the supremacy of community law. Through 
this there is clarity regarding whether community law or national law prevails in 
instances of conflict. Neither the SADC nor the COMESA make provision for the 
supremacy of community law and it is recommended that this feature be incorporated 




5.2.5 Direct Applicability and Direct Effect  
Through the provision of direct applicability, community law will apply automatically 
within Member States without having to be subjected to national rules of hierarchy. This 
measure would, therefore, provide clarity regarding the question of status.  
The principle of direct effect ensures that individuals rights are protected and can be 
enforced within Member States. This becomes even more important in communities 
that do not permit private parties to have access to community judicial organs as is the 
case within the SADC Tribunal, due to the provisions of the new Protocol on the 
Tribunal. It is therefore recommended that provision be made for these two principles 
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